INTRODUCTION

Ž .
In perfect information PI games, common knowledge of rationality Ž implies that the backward induction outcome is reached Aumann, 1995;  w x. henceforth A . Conceptually, this result depends on the notion of counterfactual conditional. It is assumed common knowledge that each player i would act rationally at each of his vertices¨, even when i knows that¨will w x not be reached; in A , we called this condition substanti¨e rationality. Though it is generally acknowledged that counterfactual reasoning is w x Ž inescapable in game theory, much of the discussion of A e.g., Binmore, . 1996 has revolved around the counterfactual nature of substantive rationality.
w x An alternative condition, called material rationality in A , stipulates that i act rationally at those of his vertices that are actually reached. The counterfactual component of this condition is much smaller than in substantive rationality. Though the players must still consider what actions might be taken at unreached vertices, nothing is a priori assumed about these actions; in particular, they are not required to be rational. Unfortunately, common knowledge of material rationality does not in general lead w x to the backward induction outcome; see, e.g., Game 1 in A .
Ž . In recent years, Rosenthal's 1982 centipede game has become a touchstone of the theory of PI games. Almost every paper on the subject mentions it, and in many it is the chief object of analysis.
1 Much of this discussion revolves around the counterfactual aspect of substantive rationality. It is therefore of some interest that in the particular case of the centipede game, common knowledge of material rationality is sufficient to ensure backward induction; one need not assume rationality at unreached vertices. The stronger, more subtle condition of substantive rationality is not needed in the centipede game. w x As in A , time plays an important role. Here, like there, ''common knowledge'' refers to the start of play. ''Rationality'' means that when choosing, the chooser does not know of a choice that yields him more; in w by denying Bob the option of choosing across at his last move.
In words: In Rosenthal's centipede game, if it is commonly known at the start of play that all players choose rationally at all reached vertices, then the first player ''goes out'' at the first move. Needless to say, this result holds also for any game ordinally equivalent to ⌫ . The idea of the proof is as follows: Let m be the last vertex that is reached at any state in CKR M ; thus in some state in R M , the vertex m is reached, and it is commonly known that no vertex beyond m is reached. If m is the first move in the game, we are finished. Otherwise, suppose w.l.o.g. that m belongs to Ann. Then when the vertex just before m is reached in , Bob knows that he can improve his payoff by going down rather than across; this contradicts his ex post material rationality.
A formal proof is given in the next section. 4¨Ž . For a characterization of R in symbols, see 3 in Section 3. 
The event ''i is ex post rational at¨'' is given bÿ¨¨R
Ž where S is the set of i's strategies for each of his strategies t , it is not the i i case that i knows at¨that t would yield him a higher conditional payoff i . at¨than the strategy he chose . w x The following four lemmas from A will be needed:
These lemmas are standard in knowledge theory, and also easily proved directly. They yield: If a is an action of i at¨, then s s a ; K s s Ž . Ž . 14 , 9 , and the rules of the game,
Ž . 
Ž .¨¨so 18 , Lemma 6, and
Ž . Ž . which is inconsistent with 14 and 17 . This completes the proof when m belongs to Ann; when it belongs to Bob, the proof is similar. X
DISCUSSION
a. Subjuncti¨es
Much of the discussion of the centipede game has centered around the following argument: On the one hand, we are told that under common Ž . knowledge of rationality CKR , Ann must go out at her first move. On the other hand, the backward induction argument for this is based on what the players would do if Ann stayed in. But, if she did stay in, then CKR is violated, so the argument that she will go out no longer has a basis.
Žw x . We have argued elsewhere A ; Aumann, 1996 that the above argument is unsound. Be that as it may, this note shows that the whole issue may be circumvented. It is not necessary to use the subjunctive mood; the proof in this note refers only to rationality at vertices that are actually reached, not to whether players ''would'' play rationally if their vertices ''were'' reached. Rather than reasoning from what happens after a given vertex, it reasons from what happens before: If some vertex is the last that can possibly be reached, then already the one before it should have been w x the last. This is quite different from the backward induction proof in A .
b. Time
The formal contrast between the ex post notion of rationality and the ex ante notion of common knowledge may disturb some readers, but closer examination reveals no awkwardness. Rationality is inherently ex post: Whether or not a given choice is rational necessarily depends on the information available at the time of the choice. This has nothing to do with the knowledgeᎏor common knowledgeᎏof such rationality, which may well refer to an entirely different time. It makes perfect sense to speak of common knowledge at the start of play that the players will choose rationally if and when one of their vertices is actually reached. That, precisely, is the hypothesis of this note.
c. Probability
Our theorem carries over without change to probabilistic models, in which play is defined as rational if and only if it maximizes expected utility Žcaution: this applies to rationality only; knowledgeᎏand common knowl-edgeᎏmust still be defined in terms of absolute certainty, not probability . 1 belief . As above, the expectations must be ex post. Compare Aumann Ž . 1996 , Sections 1 and 9.
d. The Proof
The reader may wonder why we adduce such a lengthy formal proof for an argument that while not immediate, seems simple enough once one has found it. The reason is that this area is¨ery tricky, and unless one is extremely careful and formal, it is easy to go astrayᎏas we have found, to Ž w x . our dismay, on more than one occasion. The same remark applies to A .
PREVIOUS WORK
This section, which discusses technical relations between the current w x note and A , may be omitted without affecting the understanding of the rest of the note. Ž . w x ''Common knowledge'' CK here is precisely the same as in A . ''Ex w x post rationality'' here is the same as ''rationality'' in A , except that the eẍ Ž . post knowledge operators K appearing in the definition 3 of ex post i rationality replace the ex ante knowledge operators K appearing in the i w Ž .x definition A, 3 of rationality. Thus the terminology here is fully coordiw x nated with that of A . To avoid confusion, we henceforth call the rationalw x ity concept of A by the name ''ex ante rationality.'' Ž . w Ex post rationality is stronger than i.e., implies ex ante rationality A, x w x Sect. 5e , so CK of ex post rationality implies CK of ex ante rationality. A shows that CK of ex ante substantive rationality implies backward induction; therefore, CK of ex post substantive rationality also does. Thus, w x though A formally uses the less intuitive ex ante version of rationality, the same result with the more intuitive ex post version follows easily. w x The reason that A uses the less intuitive ex ante version is that it is simpler than the ex post versionᎏthat it requires less baggage, both formal and conceptual. Specifically, the ex ante version works directly with the same partitions that are used to define CK, rather than with the ex i post partitions ¨. Since the ex ante result is logically stronger, nothing is i lost.
Why, then, don't we use the simpler ex ante version here too? The w x reason is that here, unlike in A , the ex ante version won't do; CK of ex ante material rationality does not yield backward induction in the centipede game. To show this, we now adduce an example of a centipede game in which there is common knowledge of material rationalityᎏin the w x ex ante sense of A , but not the ex post sense used hereᎏand the first player does not ''go out'' at the first vertex.
Recall that a player is ex ante materially rational if he is ex ante rational at each of his reached vertices. Denote by R A M the event ''all players are ex ante materially rational;'' in symbols,
Consider now the game ⌫ , with a state space ⍀ consisting of three states, 3 Ž . ␣,␤,␥. Ann's partition at the beginning of play is ␣ , ␤␥ , whereas Bob's Ž . Ž . Ž . is ␣␤, ␥ . Ann's strategy is across, down in state ␣, down, across in states ␤ and ␥. Bob's strategy is across in states ␣ and ␤, down in state ␥.
Ž . It may be seen that both players are ex ante materially rational at all three states, so all states are in CKR A M , but in state ␣, the players play across at the first two moves.
Bob's behavior in state ␣ may seem strange, since he knows that if his vertex is reached, Ann will go down at her next vertex, so it would be advantageous for him to go down rather than across. But, at the start of play, Bob does not know whether the state is ␣ or ␤. If it is ␣, he can improve his conditional payoff at his vertex by switching to down; this translates to a gain in actual payoff, because in state ␣, his vertex is actually reached. If the state is ␤, his conditional payoff is larger if he goes across than if he goes down, so he ''loses'' by switching. But, this ''loss'' is only in the conditional payoff, not the actual payoff, because in state ␤, his vertex is not reached. And he knows this, already at the start of play! Nevertheless, the fact remains that at the start of play he is not sure that he can improve his conditional payoff at his vertex, so by our definition, he is rational. This quirk in the definition of ex ante material rationality provides additional motivation for the ex post notion used here.
